This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal from an order continuing a Domestic Violence Order of Protection pursuant to the Arizona Constitution Article VI, Section 16, and A.R.S. Section 12-124(A).

This matter has been under advisement and the Court has considered and reviewed the record of the proceedings from the trial court, exhibits made of record and the Memoranda submitted. This Court has held this matter pending receipt of memorandum from Appellee, but none has been received.

The remaining issue raised by the Appellant concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant the continuation of the Domestic Violence Order of Protection. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must not re-weigh the evidence to determine if it would reach the same conclusion as the original trier of fact.<sup>2</sup> All evidence will be viewed in a light most favorable to sustaining a judgment and all reasonable inferences will be resolved against the Appellant.<sup>3</sup> If conflicts in evidence exists, the appellate court must resolve such conflicts in favor of sustaining the judgment and against the Appellant.<sup>4</sup> An appellate court shall afford great weight to the trial court's assessment of witnesses' credibility and should not reverse the trial court's weighing of evidence absent clear error.<sup>5</sup> When the sufficiency of evidence to support a judgment is questioned on appeal, an appellate court will examine the record only to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support the action of the lower court.<sup>6</sup> The Arizona Supreme Court has explained in *State v. Tison*<sup>7</sup> that "substantial evidence" means:

> More than a scintilla and is such proof as a reasonable mind would employ to support the conclusion reached. It is of a character which would convince an unprejudiced thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed. If reasonable men may fairly differ as to whether certain evidence establishes a fact in issue, then such evidence must be considered as substantial.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 778 P.2d 1185 (1989); State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 687 P.2d 1180, cert.denied, 469 U.S. 1040, 105 S.Ct. 521, 83 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); State v. Brown, 125 Ariz. 160, 608 P.2d 299 (1980); Hollis v. Industrial Commission, 94 Ariz. 113, 382 P.2d 226 (1963).

State v. Guerra, supra; State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 633 P.2d 355 (1981), cert.denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 180, 74 L.Ed.2d 147 (1982).

State v. Guerra, supra; State v. Girdler, 138 Ariz. 482, 675 P.2d 1301 (1983), cert.denied, 467 U.S. 1244, 104 S.Ct. 3519, 82 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In re: Estate of Shumway, 197 Ariz. 57, 3 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 977, review granted in part, opinion vacated in part 9 P.3<sup>rd</sup> 1062; Ryder v. Leach, 3 Ariz. 129, 77P. 490 (1889).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 961 P.2d 449 (1998); State v. Guerra, supra; State ex rel. Herman v. Schaffer, 110 Ariz. 91, 515 P.2d 593 (1973).

7 SUPRA.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Id. At 553, 633 P.2d at 362.

This Court finds that theCourt's order continuing the Domestic Violence Order of Protection was not clearly erroneous and was supported by substantial evidence.
IT IS ORDERED affirming theCourt's order continuing the Domestic Violence Order of Protection issued in this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter back to the Court for all further and future proceedings, if any, in this case.